Are aeronautical paths special?

Why is the aeronautical radio path between the ground and an elevated platform different to say a path between two stations on the surface? Surely the same principles are at play? Well yes they are, but it is more a question that the terrestrial path is often simplified when modelling stations near the surface of the Earth compared to the aeronautical case.

A simplification often applied, is to model of the atmosphere as uniform rather than inhomogeneous. Of course the density of air is greatest at the surface and ‘thins out’ with altitude. This may be fine for short range applications, or for those close to the surface of the Earth, but for a path that is slanted between a terrestrial station on the surface and an aircraft at altitude, the radio wave will encounter different densities of atmosphere, and so it will refract causing the ray to bend with a magnitude that varies with altitude.

To model the ray bending, ray tracing is often used with an exponential model of the atmosphere. An example of this is contained within the ITS IF77 model published in 1983 by Johnson and Gierhart. IF77 is the basis for the ITU recommendation P.528-3 on propagation for aeronautical mobile and radionavigation services using the VHF, UHF and SHF bands. The diagram below depicts an exaggerated example of the ray tracing used to generate key metrics for estimate of propagation losses for IF77.

Aircraft-effective-height

Straight line geometry over estimates the ray bending leading to horizons being predicted as further away, so a longer line-of-sight region and thus smaller propagation losses. In IF77, the ray is traced using iterative methods to find the radio horizons, and then to correct the end station heights to lower effective heights. This is one aspect of the model that is by no means unique to aeronautical, but more significant than for say land mobile over short paths. Other effects that are significant in an aeronautical context include the role of antenna systems in attenuating the Earth reflected path, some of the principles of which were discussed in the post Plane old Earth on the sea!

Despite the age of the Johnson Gierhart work, it is a current topic of discussion in ITU SG3, because it was a well researched piece, and provides a solid basis from which to model the propagation path, which is required to help satisfy the need for improved spectrum planning, mostly for sharing and coexistence studies. This need arises from the relentless pressure for more spectrum to serve both land and aeronautical mobile systems.

Vanishing planes over Europe

The disappearance of the MH370 from air traffic control displays was possibly deliberate, or perhaps just the unfortunate result of a series of failures. Time may reveal. Perhaps more worrying is the disappearance of many planes over the well monitored skies over Europe. Earlier this month, there were reports from air traffic control centres over Austria, Germany, Slovakia and the Czech republic, that a number of aircraft disappeared from radar displays, presumably arising from the failure of secondary surveillance radar. Classic symptoms of interference were in evidence, with these aircraft being lost intermittently over a few minutes. Given that multiple radars and multiple planes were subject to the same issue, it seems like a case of unintentional interference, with some rogue system blocking the transponders on the aircraft. Initially a NATO electronic warfare exercise was blamed in Hungary. The defence ministry in Hungary denied the issues citing that the electronic warfare devices only had a range of 4000 metres. Whilst it is credible that these devices are only used for intentional interference over ranges of 4 km, it is rather odd to think that the denial implies that radio waves stop their interference potential at 4 km! However, more convincing is the fact that these military exercises only coincided on one of the occasions where the interference was reported. The investigation continues to try and identify the source, but until then I wonder if we may see some more unscientific comment, including perhaps the odd conspiracy theory or two!

Revisiting aeronautical communications safeguarding

In my post on Safeguarding aeronautical communications from windfarms, I said that I would try and understand more on significant work and report back, because the official guidance was quite limited and it It was clear to me from my own projects that work had been done but frustratingly nothing published.

The Aviation Management Board Meeting held at MOD, Eskmeals on Thursday, 18 July 2013 gave a hint of the work in progress. The public minutes from the meeting contain a reference regarding work done:

“NATS was funding this £1.8m research programme over two years. It has five aims: to build on earlier work; to develop scientifically credible evidence on detrimental effects; to determine operational impacts; to develop guidance material; and for NATS to develop software tools to assess wind farm applications. QinetiQ and Pipehawk were the main contractors and the work would be undertaken at the Shooters Bottom and Red Tile sites. The research was due to start in August and run until the end of September 2013. The software would be developed by January 2015. The guidance document would need to be timed to fit in with CAA’s CAP schedule.”

So nothing tangible yet, although it turns out that NATS have published some of the trial data in an FAQ in relation to a windfarm planning application, but it is a little obscure as it only seems to appear on the Preston Council planning portal rather than being more prominent on NATS website. The FAQ confirms a little on the nature of issues and notes whilst measurements have been done, notably at Shooter Bottom Farm 2009 and Goonhilly in 2007, that there are no concrete criteria, and more work needs to be done.

Since this post was created in 2014 the FAQ link to Preston City Council planning portal in respect of AGA impact no longer functions, so I attach a copy of the FAQ from my archives. This cites a NATS internal report from December 2009 concerning Shooters Bottom Farm Field Trial which yielded an RCS of 48.6 dBm² in the back scatter region and 54.9 dBm² in the forward scatter region at VHF for a turbine of hub height 65 m and tip height 100 m.

Finally in 2019 CAP670 was updated in a more comprehensive way and now contains “Appendix A to GEN 02: Methodology for the Prediction of Wind Turbine Interference Impact on Aeronautical Radio Station Infrastructure”, which is what I presume is the culmination of this work that was due in 2015. This section includes specific methods and planning figures that can be used in make safeguarding assessments. The RCS planning figure for a large industrial turbine is 41 dBm² at VHF in the back scatter region and 51 dBm² in the forward scatter region. These figures are significantly lower than the Shooters Bottom trial, so presumably reflect other data perhaps of a more statistical nature.

Safeguarding aeronautical communications from windfarms

In doing a review of current literature on wind farm interference to aeronautical radiocommunication services, it seems that the guidance for safeguarding VHF communications has advanced little.

Windfarms-on-Aeronautical-Communications

Specifically in the UK, we have the CAA policy in the form of CAP764, which says:

“Until further information is available, issues concerning wind turbines and VHF communications should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis and reference made to the guidance contained in Section GEN-01 of CAP 670.”

Consulting CAP670, it offers safeguarding distances around the facilities and the following note:

“A wind farm whose blade tips, at their maximum height, are below the visual horizon when viewed from a point situated 25 m above an aeronautical radio station site may be acceptable to an ANSP.”

So does that mean even after a decade where specific measurements have certainly been done that there are no accepted improvements to line-of-sight modelling? When I have finished my research I will try and answer.